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Abstract
Much recent research has shed light on the development of the relation-dependent
but content-independent framework for social spammer detection. This is largely
because the relation among users is difficult to be altered when spammers at-
tempt to conceal their malicious intents. Our study investigates the spammer
detection problem in the context of multi-relation social networks, and makes
an attempt to fully exploit the sequences of heterogeneous relations for enhanc-
ing the detection accuracy. Specifically, we present the Multi-level Dependency
Model (MDM ). The MDM is able to exploit user’s long-term dependency hid-
den in their relational sequences along with short-term dependency. Moreover,
MDM fully considers short-term relational sequences from the perspectives of
individual-level and union-level, due to the fact that the type of short-term
sequences is multi-folds. Experimental results on a real-world multi-relational
social network demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed MDM on multi-
relational social spammer detection.
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1. Introduction
Social network is a space where all people interact with each other and any-
one can read, publish, and share content. While social network has several
groundbreaking benefits, it is also a breeding ground for social spammers. Ev-
eryone can reach thousands of people on social network instantaneously, their be-
haviours yet are shielded by anonymity. Consequently, extensive misbehaviours
such as the dissemination of fraudulent information and false comments may
occur. Spamming behaviour we discussed in this paper is not limited to a single
malicious activity. Instead, users with any kind of malicious activities will be
labeled as spammers. For example, when marketers send unwanted advertise-
ments or steal user information by pointing users to malicious external pages
and around 83% of social networks users have received more than one unwanted
friend request or message [1]. Such a behaviour seriously affects the develop-
ment of social network, which is required to be detected in advance so as to
maintain a healthy social network.
Considerable efforts have been devoted to transform the spammer detection
into a classification problem. As spammers are the people who spread misinfor-
mation to the public, content-based features [2, 3, 4, 5, 6] are considered as the
most representative features for the classification-based detection. For example,
Grier et al. [7] extract some content-based features according to the analysis on
Twitter spam, e.g., the ratio of tweets containing URL, the ratio of tweets with
special characters.
As the user privacy in social network has attracted increasing attention, the
metadata in social network, especially the contents, is relatively scarce. Rather
than exploiting the explicit content, researchers resort to the network topo-
logical structure that is the implicit attribute of social network with multiple
relations for social spammer detection [8, 9, 10], where relations refer to the
interactions between users (e.g., sending messages, viewing profile, thumbs up,
forward posts etc.). For instance, the network topological graph is generated
for each relation [11, 12, 13]. Meanwhile, spammers are assumed to be the
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important nodes with more links from other nodes in the graph, graph-based
features are then extracted by using several graph analytic methods (e.g., Tri-
angle count [14] and k-core [15].)
Nevertheless, these graph-based methods merely detect the spammers us-
ing the single-relation, which however violates the fact that spammers may be
connected to normal users in terms of multiple relations. Hence, the chronolog-
ical sequence of relations (i.e., [viewing profile→ thumbs up→ forward posts→
sending messages]) is usually considered to extract the sequence-based features
on multi-relational social network [16, 17, 18]. For example, Fakhraei et al. [16]
define a short sequence segment of k consecutive actions, called a k-gram, and
use the number of occurrence a k-gram sequence to partly disclose the differ-
ence between the spammers and the normal users. Although k-gram features
capture the short-term aspects of the sequence, they may miss the long-term
dependency of the sequence. Instead, to capture the salient information from
longer sequence chains, and to study the predictive power of this information,
mixture of Markov models are utilized by Peng et al. [17] to overcome the limi-
tation of small k. Specifically, Peng et al. use the ratio of posterior probabilities
and their logarithms as a small feature-set, which is identified as a small set of
important sequence from long sequence chains, for their classifier.
In general, existing sequence-based methods either exploit the long-term or
the short-term dependency, which may be more likely to ignore the underlying
correlations between them. Moreover, most existing sequence-based methods
trained merely on the limited training datasets tend to be overfitted [17, 19].
What if new spammers deliberately do not follow the known behaviour pat-
tern that they usually have? To address this issue, our goal is to expose the
deeper information hidden behind the sequence so as to identify their abnor-
mal behaviours accurately. Inspired by deep sequential networks [20, 21, 22],
we exploit both the long-term and short-term dependencies to fully learn the
deeper complementary information underlying users’ multi-relational sequences.
Specifically, long-term dependency models the users overall behaviours on multi-
relational social network based on their whole day’s relational sequences, while
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short-term dependency exploits the information of partial behaviours with the
most recent n (1 ≤ n < 10) relational sequences. Moreover, we exploit the
short-term dependency in terms of individual-level and union-level. On the
individual-level, we only consider one relation, user performed recently, that
may trigger his/her next behavior. While on the union-level, we capture the
collective influence among a union of relations that the user performs.
In this paper, we propose a novel Multi-level Dependency Model (MDM ),
which exploits user’s behaviours in terms of long-term and short-term depen-
dency from both individual-level and union-level. The individual-level depen-
dency considers only a single recent behaviour that may trigger subsequent
behaviours. In contrast, the union-level dependency considers the collective in-
fluence among a union of relations that are involved in the user’s short-term
behaviour sequence. MDM is capable of exploiting the deeper information hid-
den behind users’ relational sequence and hence improves the performance of
multi-relational social network spammer detection. The main contributions of
our paper can be summarized as:
• MDM is capable of exploiting user’s long-term behaviours hidden in their
multi-relational sequential behaviours along with short-term relational be-
haviours from multiple perspectives, which largely overcomes the limita-
tion of one-sided exploration of sequences.
• To model the short-term dependency, MDM exploits the relational se-
quences from both individual-level and union-level perspectives. Besides,
the residual network in MDM can learn high-order sequential dependency
among multi-relations.
• Extensive experiments on real-world data demonstrate that MDM out-
performs the state-of-art baselines of spammer detection.
The following sections will be organised as follows. In Section 2, we discuss
the related work and outline the limitations of the methodologies in the liter-
ature. We formulate the spammer detection problem and illustrate the overall
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framework of our proposed MDM in Section 3. Section 4 provides the technical
details of our MDM, followed by extensive experimental results in Section 5.
Finally, we conclude our work and give future plan in Section 6.
2. Related Work
In the literature, extensive work have been proposed to extract features of
the spammers in social media, including e-commerce sites [23, 24, 25, 26] and
social network sites [27, 28, 29, 30]. Generally, these methods can be categorized
into four categories: content-based [31, 32, 33], behaviour-based [34, 35, 36],
graph-based [8, 37, 38] and sequence-based methods. [16, 17, 39]
In early studies of email spams and e-commence spams, reviews/emails con-
taining similar content have a high probability to be spams [2, 3]. Various of
content-based features are designed to detect such spams in e-commerce and
emails. While content-based features mostly rely on natural language process-
ing methods, including text classification [31], text sentiment analysis [32] and
text orientation analysis [33].
Both the amount of information and the rate of generation in social networks
far exceed that of e-commerce sites and emails. In addition, social networks gen-
erally have restrictions on the number of words in text, and because of the user
privacy protection, content-based dataset is difficult to collect. Benevenuto
et al. [34] first applied statistics on spammer behaviour in YouTube. They
manually labeled the dataset to establish training data, and then analyzed the
behaviours of the labeled spammers, and defined their characteristics. They
used three feature selection algorithms in Weka to evaluate the discrimination
power of each spammer behaviour feature, and used traditional supervised clas-
sification methods to spammer classification. This method is a representative
method in the field of spammer detection in social networks, that is, based on
user behaviour characteristics to identify the network spammer. Subsequent
studies on spammer detection are inspired by this method, adding features or
optimizing detection methods to improve the accuracy of spammer detection in
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social networks.
In addition to behaviour-based methods, users in social networks will grad-
ually form a user-centric social circle through interactive behaviours, the social
relationships between users often contain rich information. Compared with nor-
mal users, spammers in social networks do not have normal social relationships,
and the relational network structure formed around spammers is relatively spe-
cial. Therefore, from the perspective of relational networks, spammers in social
networks can be well detected. Krestel et al. [37] proposed an algorithm to
identify spammers from the collaborating systems by employing a spam score
propagating technique. This method takes advantage of the characteristics that
spammers’ suspicion will spread in social networks, and then uses the spread
on the graph model to find spammers in social networks. Bhat et al. [38] found
that similar to normal users, spammers in social networks can also form the
spammer community. Therefore, they extracted user interaction graphs from
user history behaviour and found overlapping community graphs among them.
After manually marking a part of spammer nodes, they calculate the community
relationship between each node to be identified and the marked node to classify
unknown nodes. Brophy et al. [8] tried to construct a topological structure graph
for each relation on the social network, using complex network features such as
Triangle Count [14], K-Core [15], PageRank [40], connected components [41]
and other topological features to construct the features of spammers on social
networks. They assume that spammers occupy a very important position in
each network topology graph.
Nevertheless, graph-based methods are effective under the assumption that
the data is homogeneous, i.e., different types of relations are required to be
modeled separately. Unfortunately, this assumption ignores the interactions
among different types of relations. Sequence-based methods alleviate the limi-
tation of graph analytic methods to a certain extent, as it models all relations
together. In more detail, sequence-based features are extracted by converting
different types of relations into a user-wise sequence, and the length of each
sequence depends on the user. The sequence of each user is then fed into a
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feature extraction function to convert the sequence of user into a feature vec-
tor. For example, Wang et al. [39] proposed a clickstream models to calculate
the distance between each clickstream traces(i.e., sequences of click events from
users). They assume that spammers and normal users exhibit different click
transition patterns and focus their energy on different activities. Fakhraei et al.
proposed Sequential k-gram Features [16] which considers the activity order of
users by counting the frequency of each length k sub-sequences for each user.
However, Fakhraei et al. only considered the situation when k = 2, for the
reason that the large k will cost huge computing spaces. Subsequently, Peng et
al. announced that Mixture of Markov Models [17] can be used to overcome the
limitation of small k in k-gram models by identifying a small set of important
sequence from a long sequence chains. Nevertheless, Mixture of Markov Models
only considered the short-term information within users’ relational sequences.
Overall, the sequence-based features extracted in the literature can not take
long-term interactions along with the short-term information into consideration
at the same time.
3. Problem Formulation
In this section, we begin by illustrating individual-level and union-level de-
pendency of users’ interaction sequences, which actually motivates our work.
Then, we formulate the social spammer detection problem and introduce the
overall framework of our Multi-level Dependency Model.
3.1. Motivation
Inspired by the sequential recommendation method in e-commence [20, 21,
22], the most recent n items that a user bought play an important role in
the prediction of the next item user wants to buy. In the context of multi-
relational social network, we assume that the ultimate purpose of spammer is
sending messages to as much users as possible, aiming to spread false infor-
mation. Hence, the difference between spammer and normal user in the most
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recent n relations before sending a messages, instead of whole day’s relational
sequence (long-term) can be detected as the short-term dependency of their
relational sequences. Moreover, we exploit the users’ short-term relational se-
quence in terms of individual-level and union-level dependency. An example is
shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 for illustration.
(a) The relational sequence of normal user A
(b) The relational sequence of spammer E
Figure 1: Examples of individual-level dependency among the relational sequence. Normal
users may be involved in one of the given sequence of relations in (a), e.g., view posts followed
by send message. Spammer can only imitate one or two relation behaviours from normal users
(e.g.,add friend followed by send message). But it is impossible for spammers to completely
imitate the all behaviour sequences in (a), because spammers always have their own malicious
purposes.
Fig. 1(a) shows a relational sequence of a normal user A. Firstly, user A
views user B’s posts, and then view the profile of user B. User A will add user B
as friend if he/she is interested in user B. After that, they start to have further
interaction with sending messages or even give a gift. From the individual point
of view, every relation user A performed may result in the message happen as
the dotted lines with arrows indicating in Fig. 1(a). However, it is easy for
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spammer to imitate. As shown in Fig. 1(b), spammer E performed add friend
and give a gift before message to hide its behaviours from being detected.
(a) Relational sequence of normal user A
(b) Relational sequence of spammer E
Figure 2: Examples of union-level dependency among the relational sequence. The union-level
dependency can somehow capture the collective influence among a union of relations that the
spammer performs. For example, the spammer is more likely to add friend, giving a gift and
sending a message together than adding friend, giving a gift or sending a message individually.
Although spammer is capable of imitating the normal user’s individual-level
pattern, spammer may fail to imitate the union-level pattern of the relational
sequence. We can illustrate this by another example in Fig. 2(a). User A does
a message relation to user B preceded by different combination of the previous
relations. Spammer E in Fig. 2(b) may somehow copy the simplest union-level,
however, it is difficult for it to imitate a complicated union-level. Thus, in order
to improve the performance of social spammer detection, we shall exploit the
short-term dependency of user’s relational sequence from both individual-level
and union-level.
With the modeling of short-term dependency, we also exploit the long-term
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dependency among users’ relational sequences. This is mainly because only con-
sidering short-term (only a few relations user performed) is biased, as long-term
(user’s whole day or even whole week’s relational sequence) may expose user’s
general behaviour and intention. Consequently, our work exploits users’ rela-
tional sequences in terms of long-term dependency of their relational sequences
along with short-term dependency from both individual-level and union-level.
3.2. Framework Overview
Let U be the set of N users, u ∈ U be a user. Note that we will also use
ui, uj ∈ U to denote different users. Suppose there are M types of relations
among users, denoted as R = {r1, · · · , rM}. Specifically, M = 7 in our paper
indicates seven relations including “add friend”, “message”, “give a gift”, “view
profile”, “pet game”, “meet-me game”, “report abuse”. We represent each user
as a relational sequence u = 〈su1 , · · · , sut , · · · , suT 〉, where sut ∈ R, 1 ≤ t ≤ T
and the index t denotes the order in which one type of relation is used by u.
The target of spammer detection is to estimate the likelihood that every user
belongs to the spammer class, denoted as P (yu = spammer|u), where yu is the
label of u within the domain {normal user, spammer}. For simplicity, we let
φu = P (yu = spammer|u) and it is defined as:
φu = F(u, n) ·
∑
rm∈u
m>rm , (1)
where mrm ∈ Rd is the embedding of relation, rm ∈ R, n is the selected most
recent n relations for short-term modeling. F(u, n) is the output of proposed
MDM.
The overall architecture of proposed MDM consists of User-relation Repre-
sentation, Long-term Dependency Modeling and Short-term Dependency Mod-
eling as shown in Fig. 3. MDM first uses skip-gram with Recurrent Neural
Network for representing user-relation into vector embedding. As shown in the
bottom layer of Fig. 3, the input of this layer is one user’s relational sequence
u = 〈su1 , · · · , sut , · · · , suT 〉. While the output is the d-dimensional latent vector
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of the input relational sequence.
Figure 3: Framework of Multi-level Dependency Model (MDM ).
After that, MDM models long-term order constraint over the whole user-
relation vector embeddings with a Long-term Dependency Modeling layer. The
Long-term Dependency Modeling layer maps the whole user-relation vectors into
a sequence of hidden vectors. With the output of User-relation Representation
layer, Long-term Dependency Modeling generates the most recent n relations
latent vectors as matrix Hu. More importantly, we design one further step
to input Hu to an attention layer, from which the short-term dependency is
learned by Short-term Dependency Modeling, as shown in Fig. 3. This is similar
to the most recent n items containing the potential intentions and preferences
of the user, which can predict users’ next behaviour. Finally, both long-term
and short-term hidden information are extracted as embedding features and fed
into a classification model for the spammer detection task. All the notations
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are listed in Table 1.
Table 1: Summary of notations
Notation Description
L,S,U Set of normal users, spammers and all users respectively, L ∪ S = U
u User’s relational sequence, u = 〈su1 , · · · , sut , · · · , suT 〉, u ∈ UR Set of relations, R = {r1, · · · , rm, · · · rM}
F(u, n) Output of MDM
mrm The embedding of relation, mrm ∈ Rd
eut The user-relation representation for position t in u, e
u
t ∈ Rd
zut Output of Long-term Dependency Modeling, z
u
t ∈ Rd
un Set of most recent happened n relations, un = 〈suT−1, suT−2, · · · , suT−n〉
Hu The most recent n relations’ outputs from Long-term Dependency Modeling layer
k, L Numbers of layers for ResNetR and ResNetE respectively
Hu1 ,H
u
2 , · · · ,Huk Hidden status of ResNetR
vl High-order features for each layer of ResNet
R, vl ∈ Rd (0 ≤ l ≤ k)
hki: Corresponding i-th row of matrix H
u
k
αki Weight scale for vk
[v0,v1, · · · ,vk]> Set of aggregated high-order features
v Output of Multi-order Attention with ResNetR (indiviual-level) layer
β Attention weight vector, β ∈ Rk+1
gL Output of L-layer ResNet
E (union-level) layer
Θ Parameters for optimizing, including:
WLSTM for long-term modeling; Wk, bk for ResNet
R;
ω1, ω2, c1, c2, ϕ1, ϕ2, b1, b2 for attention model and WL, bL for ResNet
E .
4. Multi-level Dependency Model
This section discusses the three components of Multi-level Dependency Model
(MDM ) in more details.
4.1. User-relation Representation
Before exploiting the hidden information behind user’s relational sequence,
our prior problem is to model it. In order to reveal relation’s sequential charac-
teristics which is implied in the relational sequence, it is necessary to find an ef-
fective representation method to directly learn high-quality user-relation vectors
from the users’ relational sequences. We apply the skip-gram with Recurrent
Neural Network [42] to generate user-relation representations by exploiting the
users’ relational sequences.
Specifically, given a relation rm (1 ≤ m ≤ M) and a user’s relational se-
quence u = 〈su1 , · · · , sut , · · · , suT 〉, we denote the likelihood of sut = rm as
P (rm| t, u) = exp(ε(rm, s
u
t ))∑M
m′=1 exp(ε(rm′ , s
u
t ))
, (2)
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where ε(rm, s
u
t ) = mrm · eu
>
t , mrm ∈ Rd (1 ≤ m ≤ M) is the latent vector for
each relation in R, and eut ∈ Rd is the user-relation representation for position
t (1 ≤ t ≤ T ) in u. To obtain the embedding mrm and eut , the Embedding layer
implemented by RNN optimize the objective function as follows:
max
mrm ,e
u
t
M∑
m=1
T∑
t=1
logP (rm| t, u) = max
mrm ,e
u
t
M∑
m=1
T∑
t=1
log
exp[mrm · eu
>
t ]∑M
m′=1 exp[mrm′ · eu
>
t ]
,
(3)
where T is the length of relational sequence u, and M is the number of relations.
4.2. Long-term Dependency Modeling
To model the long-term dependency of user’s relational sequence on multi-
relational social networks, we apply a standard LSTM [43] as in Fig. 3 over
the whole relational sequence. For each u ∈ U we can get a user-relation rep-
resentation from Eq. (3), denoted as {eu1 , · · · , eut , · · · , euT } , where eut denotes
the d-dimensional latent vector of position t. Given the user-relation represen-
tation for user u from the last User-relation Representation layer, we can ob-
tain a sequence of hidden vectors {zu1 , · · · , zut , · · · , zuT } by recurrently inputting
eut (1 ≤ t ≤ T ) into LSTM, i.e.,
zut = LSTM(e
u
t , z
u
t−1,WLSTM ), (4)
where LSTM is the output function of Long Short-Term Memory, WLSTM con-
tains the weight parameters and we set zu0 = 0.
Through this stage, the Long-term Dependency Modeling in Fig. 3 outputs a
sequence {zu1 , · · · , zut , · · · , zuT } for the next multi-order attentive relation mod-
eling stage. Since only capturing long-term dependency is not sufficient, as it
neglects the importance of adjacent relation within the sequence. In next sec-
tion, we will illustrate how to augment long-term dependency with short-term
dependency in terms of individual-level and union-level.
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4.3. Short-term Dependency Modeling
In this section, we will discuss how to extend general user’s embedding with
short-term dependency over a small set of the most recent n happened relations,
which can be denoted as un = 〈suT−1, suT−2, · · · , suT−n〉.
As can be seen from Fig. 3 the MDM applies ResNet to learn high-order non-
linear interactions among the short-term dependency of un. MDM instantiates
two residual networks with a fully connected multi-layer perceptron, i.e., k-layer
ResNetR for individual-level and L-layer ResNetE for union-level, respectively.
4.3.1. Individual-level
As shown in Fig. 1, the individual-level dependency among the relational
sequence may result in different subsequent relations for the normal user and
spammer, respectively. In other words, exploiting the individual-level depen-
dency will definitely benefit the spammer detection. Thus, we take the most
recent n relations’ outputs from the last Long-term Dependency Modeling layer,
denoted as Hu ∈ Rn×d:
Hu =

zuT−1
zuT−2
...
zuT−n
 , (5)
where zuT−1 is produced by Eq. (4) with t = T −1. And we use Hu as the input
of Multi-order Attention with ResNetR (individual-level) layer shown in Fig. 3.
Then, we propose an attention mechanism to aggregate high-order features of
individual level dependency as show in Fig. 4.
With the input embedding Hu, the Multi-order Attention with ResNetR
(individual-level) layer is instantiated with a k-layer residual network ResNetR,
i.e., ResNet(k,Hu). Then, we can obtain the output of a sequence of hidden
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Figure 4: Multi-order Attention Network.
status as
Hu1 = ReLU(H
uW1 + b1 +H
u)
Hu2 = ReLU(H
u
1W2 + b2 +H
u
1 )
· · · · · ·
Huk = ReLU(H
u
k−1Wk + bk +H
u
k−1),
(6)
where ReLU is the activation function for rectifier linear unit, Huk ∈ Rn×d is the
high-order features generated at k-th layer of ResNetR, k denotes the maximum
number of residual layers. Wk ∈ Rd×d and bk ∈ Rd denote weight matrix and
bias vector, respectively.
The sequence of hidden status from ResNetR, i.e., {Hu1 ,Hu2 , · · · ,Huk}, can
capture potential high-order interactions between partial fields in relation em-
bedding, which helps us to discriminate the significance of relations in different
levels with respect to a given relational sequence. Besides the high-order fea-
tures, we also keep the raw embedding Hu, resulting a set of extended encoded
features {Hu0 ,Hu1 , · · · ,Huk}, where Hu0 = Hu.
To aggregate {Hu0 ,Hu1 , · · · ,Huk}, we use a soft attention model. We denote
vl ∈ Rd (0 ≤ l ≤ k) as the contextual embedding for each layer, which can be
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generated by the soft attention model [20] as follows.
v0 =
n∑
i=1
α0i · h0i:
v1 =
n∑
i=1
α1i · h1i:
· · · · · ·
vk =
n∑
i=1
αki · hki:,
(7)
where hki: (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is the corresponding i-th row of matrix Huk . And weight
scale αki is normalized by a softmax layer on the attention scores,
∑n
i=1 α
k
i =
1. We utilize a network with two-layers to calculate the attention scores with
Eq. (8).
αki = ω1tanh(ω2h
k
i: + c1) + c2
αki =
exp(αki )∑n
i′=1 exp(α
k
i′)
,
(8)
where ω1, ω2 are the shared weight matrices for attention layer. Then, the
final contextual embedding of short-term dependency with the most recent n
relations is
v = β[v0,v1, · · · ,vk]>
β = softmax(ϕ1tanh(ϕ2[v0,v1, · · · ,vk]> + b1) + b2),
(9)
where ϕ1, ϕ2 are the weight matrices for attention layer and β ∈ Rk+1 is the
attention weight vector. According to Eq. (7) and Eq. (9), we can obtain the
final contextual embedding v on individual-level as Eq. (10)
v = β ·
k∑
l=0
n∑
i=1
αli · hli:. (10)
16
4.3.2. Union-level
In addition to the individual-level dependency, we also exploit the union-
level of short-term dependency among the relational sequences of users. As
shown in Fig. 2, although spammers might imitate some individual-level pat-
terns from the normal users’ relational sequences, it is difficult for them to
imitate a complicated combination of normal relations, i.e., union-level depen-
dency. Therefore, we argue that individual-level and union-level dependency
can be complementary to tackle users’ short-term relational sequences.
The union-level dependency can be conceptually understood by estimating
the probability of an associate rule X → Y , where X is the most recent n rela-
tions of one user and Y is the subsequent relation to be performed. In particular,
we combine attention network and residual network to represent relation set X.
Specifically, we use the embedding features from individual-level as the input
to a multi-layer perceptron with residual structure, instantiated as ResNetE .
With the input v given by Eq. (10), ResNetE outputs the representation of
union-level dependencies as follows.
g1 = ReLU(vW1 + b1 + v)
g2 = ReLU(g1W2 + b2 + g1)
· · · · · ·
gL = ReLU(gL−1WL + bL + gL−1),
(11)
where WL ∈ Rd×d and bL ∈ Rd denote weight matrix and bias vector, respec-
tively.
4.4. Objective Function
To concatenate individual-level features with union-level features, we formu-
late F(u, n) in Eq. (1) for user with relational sequence u ∈ U as:
F(u, n) = v + gL, (12)
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where v is given by Eq. (10) and gL is given by Eq. (11). F(u, n) is then
the embedding of context information integrated at both individual-level and
union-level. Afterwards, the predictive model Eq. (1) can be extended as:
φu = F(u, n) ·
∑
rm∈u
m>rm = (v + gL) ·
∑
rm∈u
m>rm . (13)
The spammers will have relative larger values of Eq. (13) than normal users,
i.e., φui > φuj .
The predictive model φu can be fitted by optimizing the underlying parame-
ters Θ that is from WLSTM in Eq. (4), ResNet
R in Eq. (6), ResNetE in Eq. (11)
and soft attention model in Eq. (10). Let S represents the set of spammers’ rela-
tional sequences and L denotes the set of normal users’ relational sequences, i.e.,
U = S ∪L. With the inputs of user-relation sequences u = 〈su1 , · · · , sut , · · · , suT 〉,
Θ can be obtained by optimizing the following objective function:
arg min
Θ
∑
ui∈S
∑
uj∈L
−I(φui , φuj ) +
λ
2
||Θ||2F , (14)
where I(·, ·) is an indicator function that equals 1 for φui > φuj , otherwise equals
0, || · ||2F represents Frobenius norm weighted with a hyper-parameter λ. We use
Adam optimizer [44] to optimize the objective function (14) and produce the
optimal Θ. The pseudocode of leveraging MDM for social spammer detection
is presented in Alg. 1. 1
4.5. An Illustrating Example
In order to better understand the overall process of our proposed MDM, we
give a simple example in this section.
The input of our method is the user’s relational sequence collected from
Tagged.com, e.g., u = 〈5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 3, 5, 4, 4〉. When inputting u to our MDM
method, User-relation Representation layer outputs two components: One is a
1 The details of step 1, 2 and 3 can be found in Fig. 3
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm of Leveraging MDM for Social Spammer Detection
Input: Labeled set U = S ∪L includes all users’ relational sequences, and each
user’s relational sequence is u = 〈su1 , · · · , sut , · · · , suT 〉; Number of relations
for short-term n; Embedding size d; Number of layers k.
Output: Users’ label: {Spammer, Normal user}.
1: procedure MDM(U , n, d, k)
2: repeat
3: for each u ∈ U do
4: Compute eut and mrm via Eq. (3); . Step 1
5: Compute the long term embedding zu1 , · · · , zuT by Eq. (4); . Step 2
6: Compute Hu via Eq. (5); . Step 3, individual-level
7: Compute {Hu0 ,Hu1 , · · · ,Huk} via Eq. (6); . Hu0 = Hu
8: Compute [v0,v2, · · · ,vk]> by {Hu0 ,Hu1 , · · · ,Huk} via Eq. (7);
9: Compute the embedding of individual level v via Eq. (9);
10: Compute the embedding of union level gL by Eq. (11); . union-level
11: Compute F(u, n) via Eq. (12); . Concatenate
12: Update the parameter set Θ in (14) by Adam algorithm;
13: end for
14: until converge.
15: end procedure
16: procedure Prediction(MDM(·), U)
17: Take the output of MDM, F(u, n), as the feature for each user u;
18: Use classification model to classifier spammers and normal users;
19: end procedure
d-dimensional latent vector eut (1 ≤ t ≤ 9) for each item in the input sequence
u, resulting in a 9× d matrix; Another one is the d-dimensional embeddings of
7 relations, [mr1 ,mr2 , · · · ,mr7 ]>. The first component 9 × d matrix is then
input to Long-term Dependency Modeling layer that outputs a sequence of hid-
den vectors, i.e., [zu1 , z
u
2 , · · · , zut , · · · , zu9 ]>. Then, we define the most recent n
relations latent vectors (i.e., [zu7 , z
u
8 , z
u
9 ]
>) as the matrix Hu ∈ Rn×d. Hu is
then input into the Short-term Dependency Modeling (individual-level) layer.
We can obtain the final contextual embedding v ∈ Rd at individual-level and
gL ∈ Rd at union-level. Finally, our MDM method outputs the concentration
of v, gL and [mr1 ,mr2 , · · · ,mr7 ]> as the learned embedding features for user
u. This embedding can be further input into traditional classification methods
to detect whether user u is spammer or not.
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Table 2: 7 relations in the Tagged.com dataset
Relation ID Relation Name
r1 Give a Gift
r2 Add Friend
r3 View Profile
r4 Message
r5 Pet Game
r6 Meet-Me Game
r7 Report Abuse
5. Experimental Evaluation
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed Multi-level Dependency Model
(MDM ), experiments were conducted on a large real-world dataset from the
website www.tagged.com. Comparisons were made against several state-of-art
methods for spammer detection on multi-relational social networks, including
graph-based and sequence-based methods. Our algorithm was implemented in
TensorFlow and experiments were conducted on a computer with 28 CPU cores
and 256GB memory.
5.1. Experimental Setup
5.1.1. Dataset
The dataset 2 used in this experiment was from www.tagged.com, which is a
website for people to meet and socialize with new friends. The dataset contains
7 types of directed relations, as shown in Table 2. The ground truth label is
provided by domain experts to mark each user as normal user or spammer.
Specifically, the domain experts manually reviewed all users receiving a high
number of “abuse reports” and terminated their accounts once confirmed. This
dataset is a benchmark data for sophisticated spammers identification on multi-
relational social networks. For fair comparison, we use the same extraction
process as in [16]. The data is stored as quad-tuples: 〈timestamp, usrci , udestj , rm〉,
2 The dataset we used in this paper is published with the paper “collective spammer detection
in evolving multi-relational social networks” published on SIGKDD2015. It can be found here:
https : //linqs− data.soe.ucsc.edu/public/socialspammer/?C = S;O = A
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Table 3: Statistics of Tagged.com dataset
Dataset Tagged.com
#user 4, 111, 179
#spammer 182, 939
#normal user 3, 928, 240
#interactions 85, 470, 637
AVG length of relational sequence 21
where user usrci performs relation rm on user u
dest
j . We extracted all relations of
a day, resulted in a dataset containing 85M interactions among 4M users, i.e.,
average length of one user’s relational sequence is 21. Out of 4M users, 182K of
them are labeled as spammers, i.e., 4.45%. Statistics of the dataset is shown in
Table 3.
5.1.2. Evaluation Metrics
Since the ground-truth label of each user is provided by the dataset, we adopt
three well-known metrics including Precision (P), Recall (R) and F-measure (F)
for evaluation. We have
R =
TP
TP + FN
, P =
TP
TP + FP
, F =
2P ·R
P +R
, (15)
where TP is the number of spammers that have been identified correctly, on
contrast, FP is the number of spammers that have been mis-identified, and FN
is the number of spammers that are not identified by the model. Depending on
the application scenario, a trade-off can be made on these metrics. Precision
and recall are contradictory metrics. Higher recall indicates that more spam-
mers are detected. Meanwhile, as higher recall takes more users as spammers,
and it may result in low precision. Higher precision may lead to low recall,
as higher precision represents for higher confidence on detected spammers thus
more spammers are missed. F-measure is a measure of trade-off between preci-
sion and recall, which is denoted as a weighted average of the precision and recall.
Here our focus is mainly on evaluating the quality of features extracted from
multi-relational data, rather than comparing the classification algorithm per-
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formance. Thus, we select two most representative supervised models, namely
Logistic Regression (LR) [45] and XGBoost (XGB) [46] to classify spammers.
To avoid overfitting issue, we adopt From 10-fold cross-validation for selecting
the optimal parameters for Logistic Regression and XGBoost. For Logistic Re-
gression, we specify l2 norm penalty with the default strength C = 1. We also
set tolerance as 0.0001 for stopping criteria and the maximum number of iter-
ations as 50. We use XGBoost to implement the tree-based components of all
methods, where the number of trees is 200 and the maximum depth of trees is
5.
5.1.3. Baselines
Several state-of-the-art graph-based and sequence-based methods are chosen
as the baselines. Specifically, graph-based features are extracted by converting
relations into a directed graph G, where the vertices V represent the users and
the edges E represent the relations user performed. In Tagged.com dataset, there
are 7 types of relations, one graph is generated for each of them: {G1, . . . ,G7}.
Then, for each graph we use Graphlab Create3 to extract graph-based features,
including Triangle Count [14], k-core [15], Graph Coloring [47], Page Rank [40],
Degree [16], and Weakly Connected Components [41]. This converts a directed
graph into either a numerical or categorical feature matrix for each kind of
relation. That thus totally generates 7 × 8 graph-based features. The graph-
based feature can be viewed as a 56-dimensional vector.
Sequential k-gram aims to construct the sequence by the short sequence
segment of k consecutive actions. The sequence can be represented as a vector
of the frequencies of the k-grams. To keep the feature space computationally
manageable, the baseline method [16] sets k = 2, e.g., sequence 1-1 or 2-1. That
means we have 49 types of sequences for the 7 relations, which indicates the
dimension of the sequence is 49. For a specific user with behaviour of 1-1-2-3, the
corresponding 49 dimensional sequence vector is [1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0].
3 https://turi.com/
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5.2. Experimental Results
The embedding size d in our MDM is chosen from {8, 16, 32}, where d = 32
produces the best results on all three metrics. We use the most recent n relations
for short-term dependency modeling, where n is chosen from {2, 4, 6, 8} with
n = 6 producing the best results on F-measure and precision. We also try
different number of hidden layers of ResNetR and ResNetE , from {2, 4}, as we
find that 4 layers are enough to ensure competitive results for both ResNetR
and ResNetE .
After getting all the features from baseline methods and MDM, we split
train and test dataset with 10 different random seeds for evaluation on LR and
XGB classifiers. First, we compare our MDM with them separately. Then, we
combine the baseline methods together to show the effectiveness of our proposed
model.
5.2.1. Overall Comparison with Baselines
Table 4 shows the comparison performance of our MDM and baselines. We
can find that the higher recall rate happens along with the lower precision. That
means normal users may be falsely identified as spammers to guarantee more
spammers are detected. In this case, recall rate and precision are not sufficient
to verify the effectiveness of our method. We further introduce F-measure to
evaluate our performance by computing the harmonic mean of the precision and
recall. As can be seen, MDM has shown a significant performance advantage
over baseline methods on F-measure both with LR and XGB, which means we
can catch the spammer more accurately with the least harm to normal users.
Encouragingly, the precisions of MDM consistently are the highest ones with
the best performing parameters (d = 32, n = 6, k = 4), giving the proof that the
proposed features can reveal the most of spammers with a little loss in recalls. In
terms of recall, although sequential k-gram features enjoy the highest position,
they show the worst performance on precision as the price, which means they
treat more users as spammers and greatly affect the normal users.
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Table 4: Performance comparison with baselines (the best result of each metric is bold)
Logistic Regression (LR) XGBoost (XGB)
Methods Precision Recall F-measure Precision Recall F-measure
Graph-based [8] 0.5576 0.6937 0.6182 0.6378 0.6712 0.6541
Sequential k-gram [16] 0.5217 0.8620 0.6500 0.5268 0.9221 0.6705
Graph-based+Sequential k-gram 0.6116 0.8600 0.7148 0.6253 0.9127 0.7421
MDM 0.6909 0.8243 0.7516 0.7385 0.8154 0.7750
5.2.2. Effect of Parameters within MDM
We further evaluate the performance of the MDM with respect to the pa-
rameter settings. First, we vary the sequences length in short-term information
modeling. The comparison is set on different n chosen from {2, 4, 6, 8}. Fig. 5
shows the comparison results of different setups. The results show that when
other parameters are set equal, n = 6 promotes the best performance. One
presumable assumption is that 6 steps of behaviours can better summarize a
user’s intention in Tagged.com.
Then we analyze MDM ’s performance by varying the embedding size d from
{8, 16, 32}. Fig. 6 shows the performance of each size of embedding features on
precision, recall and F-measure separately. Obviously, the three metrics’ rates
increase with the raise of dimension, giving the sign that more spammers will
be disclosed when increasing the embedding dimension of our MDM and more
accurate it will be.
In general, it shows that the most effective performance has been achieved
on 32 embedding features. Limited by the computing space, we only carry the
embedding size to 32. Nevertheless, the number of embedding size depends on
the dataset. One recommendation is that the number of embedding features
should be increased alongside the number of types of relations, because more
type of relations implies more complex interactions.
5.2.3. Components Influence of MDM
MDM contains three components as indicated in Fig. 3, i.e. User-relation
Representation, Long-term Dependency Modeling, and Short-term Dependency
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Figure 5: Performances of MDM under different sequence lengths n.
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Figure 6: Performances of MDM under different embedding sizes d.
modeling, where the last component is made up of individual-level and union-
level. In order to analyze the impact of the different components to the overall
detection performance, we set different combinations of components for evalua-
tion. The comparison results are shown in Table 5.
It can be seen from the table that although User-relation Representation
obtains the highest recall on both LR and XGB, its precision and F-measure
score are the lowest. After adding the Long-term Dependency Modeling layer,
the precision increases with a little drop in recall and the overall F-measure score
rise on both LR and XGB. That is to say, Long-term Dependency Modeling layer
can help lifting the social spammer detection performance as we estimated.
After we take Short-term Dependency modeling (individual-level) into con-
sideration, we can see from the table that both precision and F-measure have
been greatly improved, indicating that the short-term dependency within the
relational sequence largely boosts with the users’ hidden sequential information
modeling. Afterwards, the proposed MDM, consisting of all three layers, gets
the best performance on precision and F-measure with the best performing pa-
rameters (d = 32, n = 6, k = 4). In other words, with MDM we can detect more
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spammers correctly and without harming normal users.
Table 5: Performance comparison on different components in MDM (+ represents adding a
layer to the last row, and the best result of each metric is bold)
Logistic RegressionD (LR) XGBoost (XGB)
Components Precision Recall F-measure Precision Recall F-measure
User-relation Representation 0.5399 0.8496 0.6602 0.5778 0.8722 0.6951
+ Long-term 0.5687 0.8467 0.6804 0.5937 0.8718 0.7064
+ Individual-level 0.6314 0.8477 0.7237 0.6659 0.8523 0.7477
MDM 0.6909 0.8243 0.7516 0.7385 0.8154 0.7750
5.3. Discussion
We have studied the sequences of behaviours in the multi-relational social
network (i.e.,Tagged.com) to detect unknown spammers. From our experi-
ments, we found some interesting spamming behaviour. Our results indicate
that users with the sequences 〈5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5〉, 〈5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 4〉, 〈4, 4, 3, 5, 4, 4〉 are
easily detected as spammers in our proposed MDM. However, the dataset col-
lected from Tagged.com does not connect the relation names with the specific
number. Namely, from the dataset, we do not know which number corresponds
to which relation. To fully understand the behaviour behind this sequence,
we use statistic analysis technology to infer what relationship does the num-
ber represent for. For example the sequence 〈5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5〉. We infer that 5
is a “Pet Game”. 〈5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5〉 means the user has been always playing this
“Pet Game”. The users have such a behaviour sequence is recognized as the
spammer. Because Tagged.com has a reward mechanism for “Pet Game”. In
order to be seen/contacted by more users, the spammers always gaining more
reward by playing “Pet Game” will appear on the celebrity list. In addition to
such special sequences, we find that a user that repeats a single relation and
occasionally transforms one or two relations to hide its behaviour is more likely
to be a spammer.
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6. Conclusion
In this work, we propose a novel Multi-level Dependency Model (MDM) to
fully learn the deeper complementary information underlying users’ relational
sequences. MDM exploit user’s behaviours in terms of the long-term and short-
term dependencies. In particular, the short-term dependency can be sufficiently
exploited in terms of both individual-level and union-level. Therefore, MDM is
capable of exposing the deep information underlying the relational sequences
so as to improve the accuracy of identifying abnormal behaviours. We conduct
extensive experiments on real-world dataset from Tagged.com, which verifies
that MDM significantly outperforms other baselines. The main limitation of
this work, due to privacy concerns, it is focused on relations (i.e., interactions
between users) only without considering the free text information. In the future,
it is worth exploring the possibility of incorporating text information into the
modelling process, for example, applying to a Twitter data set. In order to
generate MDM on other multi-relational data set, e.g., Twitter data set, we
need to decompose the user behaviour into several relations, then pick up all
relations without duplication, and assign each of them with a unique number.
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